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A number of Joan Robinson's classic results on third-degree
monopolistic price discrimination are generalized and extended.
The relation between demand function curvature and the impact of
monopolistic discrimination on total output is clarified in the
general N-market case. It is shown that unless total output is
increased sufficiently, monopolistic discrimination produces a
net (Marshallian) efficiency loss. Qualifications necessary if
discrimination allows new markets to be served are discussed.
Under pure Pigouvian third-degree price discrimination, a monopolist
maximizes profits by charging different prices to different markets or
classes of customers, with no (second-degree discriminatory) bulk discounts
or other nonlinear pricing allowed. The standard comparison of such
conduct with that of a single-price monopoly remains that presented by
Joan Robinson (Book V) almost a half-century ago. Using an algebraic
approach, this note generalizes and extends some of her main results.
Robinson (pp. 190-2) shows geometrically that if a single-price monop-
oly selling in two markets under constant costs is allowed to discriminate
between them, total output is unchanged if both markets have linear demand
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curves. This result is easily extended to the N-market case below. If
demand curves are not linear, she argues (pp. 192-5) that a comparison of
their "adjusted concavities" at the nondiscriminating monopoly price deter-
mines whether total output rises or falls. Her formal argument depends
critically on the assumption that the discriminating monopoly's prices are
nearly equal, however, and Melvin Greenhut and H. Ohta show by (non-
pathological) example that her proposed test does not work when those prices
differ substantially. The general relation between curvature of demand
functions and total output changes due to monopolistic discrimination is
analyzed below,
Robinson's discussion of the welfare implications of discrimination
(ch. 16) is very brief and informal, and it emphasizes equity as much as
efficiency. Perhaps because of this, much of the subsequent literature
seems to equate the efficiency effects of discrimination with its impact
on total output. Basil Yamey uses a rather special example to argue
that this equation is invalid; he asserts that in general the usual
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Marshallian welfare measure falls unless output increases. This assertion
is confimed below for the general N-market case with arbitrary demand
function curvatures. As an immediate corollary, it follows that if all
demands are linear, prohibiting a monopoly from practicing third-degree
discrimination produces a net welfare gain.
The intuition behind these last results was presented by Pigou
(pp. 284-5, 288-9) and cited by Robinson (p. 206). For any fixed total
output of the monopolized product, efficiency requires that all buyers
have the same marginal valuation of additional units. (If all buyers are
households, they must have the same marginal rate of substitution between
the good involved and any numeraire good.) Selling the same product at
different prices to different buyers induces different marginal valuations
and produces what Robinson (p. 206) terms "a maldistribution of re-
sources as between different uses." Only an increase in total output above
the single-price monopoly level can serve to offset this distributional
inefficiency. Thus, unless total output increases, monopolistic third-
degree price discrimination produces a net efficiency loss.
I. Preliminaries
Consider a monopolist selling in N distinguishable markets (or to
N distinguishable customer classes). Let qi be unit sales in market i,
let Q be the sum of the qi, and let Pi be the price charged in market i. For
simplicity, it is generally assumed to be optimal for the monopolist to
make positive sales in all N markets, whether or not discrimination is
possible. (See footnote 1, above.) Following the relevant literature
(for reasons discussed below), qi is assumed to depend only on Pi for
i = 1,.., N, and unit cost, c, is assumed constant.
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The monopoly's total profit can be written as
N N
(1) t= Z (Pi - c)q( i(Pi) i(
i=l i=l
where qi(Pi) is the demand function for market i, and i(Pi) is net profit
generated in that market, for i = 1, ..., N. It is assumed that the ff. are
smooth, strictly concave functions. (We basically need smooth and declining
marginal revenue curves.) If discrimination is impossible, profits are
maximized by charging all buyers p*, the unique solution to
N N 1
(2) i- i'() i (p* - c) q(p*) + qi(P*) 0
On the other hand, if pure third-degree discrimination is possible, the N
optimal prices are found as the unique solutions to
(3) Vi(pi ) = - c) qi(Pi) + q(p) 0 i = 1, ..., N.
Following Robinson's terminology, let the strong markets be those in
which p exceeds p*, and let S be the set of the corresponding indices.
Similarly, let W be the set of indices of the weak markets, in which
P* > pi, and let I be the set of indices of the intermediate markets, if
any, for which p* = p*. Because unit cost is constant and individual
market demands are determined only by own prices, it is immediate that
iS (iW) if and only if rr!(p*) is positive (negative). Under such regular
and separable conditions, gradient methods work well, and a related method
is used in what follows. It may be possible to permit some cross-effects
and still use the basic approach employed here, but I have so far found
no economically meaningful way of doing this.
If income effects are assumed small and distributional effects are
neglected, we can employ the standard aggregate Marshallian welfare indicator,
consumers' surplus plus producer's (excess) profits;
N X
(4) W = q (v)dv + i(Pi)
i=l p
P i
Let us consider a set of smooth functions, Pi(t), for i = 1, ..., N
and t 0, such that Pi(O) = p* and Pi is the limit of pi(t) as t increases.
We can then compare single-price and discriminating monopoly output, for
instance, by examining (dQ/dt) along such a transition path. It is useful
to impose two restrictions on the pi(t). First, dpi/dt must have the sign
of i. Thus for is (iEW), Pi is monotonically increasing (decreasing).
Second, the sum of the iT must be zero for all t. (This sum is zero at
both.ends of the transition by (2) and (3), above.) This second restriction
implies
N N
(5) i ] P i 1 q (Pi- c) qi] Pi 0
An examination of Figure 1 establishes that such functions exist
when N = 2, and the relevant aspects of the geometry there are also present.
when N exceeds two. Because cross-price effects have been assumed away,
the iso-profit curves always have. positive slope when Pw < Pw < p* and
P* < < P*. Point N is the nondiscriminating monopoly optimum, while
* s
D is the discriminating monopoly equilibrium, ZZ' is the locus of points
such that ( + WI) is zero; its negative slope follows from the strict
concavity of the i', Clearly, any pair of functions, Ps(t) and Pw(t),
that move prices from N to D along ZZI satisfy both restrictions in the
preceding paragraph,4
2, Results
From the definition of Q and condition (5), we have immediately
N N
(6) dQ/dt 2 q!p (-1/2) 7 (Pi -c c) p.
It llow directly from the econd equality that ddt i zero if demand=l
It follows directly from the second equality that dQ/dt is zero if demand
curves are all linear, so that for any N, single-price and discriminating
monopolies would produce the same total output.
Robinson's (pp. 193-5) "adjusted concavity" test rests on the assumption
that the p are sufficiently close to p* that, essentially, one need only
sign dQ/dt at tQ in order to determine the effect of monopoly discrimination
on total output, In the more natural case in which the P differ noticeably,
so that discrimination suggests itself with some force, it should be clear
that this sort of first-order local test can fail, essentially because dQ/dt
can change sign, The "adjusted concavity" test would thus seem to have
little real value,
Before presenting that test, however, Robinson (p. 193) makes some
general remarks about the global consequences of demand function curvature
when N = 2 that can readily be verified and extended to the case of N 2
by examination of (6). If market i is strong, the corresponding term in
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the second summation in (6) has the sign of (-q); it is thus positive for
strictly convex curves and negative for strictly concave ones. Thus if all
weak markets have linear demands and all strong market demand curves are
strictly convex (concave) a move from single-price to discriminating
monopoly always raises (lowers) total output, no matter how much the
p* differ from p* and each other. Similarly, strict concavity (convexity)
of demand functions in weak markets is associated with output increases
(decreases). (Recall that p is always negative for iW.) If all demand
functions are strictly concave or convex and if the p are not nearly
equal, there is apparently no simple, general way to tell if monopolistic
discrimination will raise or lower total output.5
All the formal analysis so far rests on the assumption that qi(p*)
and qi(pt) are positive for all i. This assumption is clearly rather
strong, however: some weak markets may not be served at all by a single-
price monopoly even though a discriminating monopolist could profitably
make sales to them. All the results above must therefore be qualified by
noting the tendency of a discriminating monopoly to serve markets that
would be excluded by a single-price seller. The sales made in such markets
under discrimination must be added to the output increases computed above
in order to assess the full effects of discrimination on total output, a
point that Robinson stresses. If one thinks that demand functions are
as likely to be concave as convex, recognition of this effect would lead
one to conclude that total output is more likely to be increased than
decreased by allowing a monopoly to practice third-degree discrimination.
Next, let us go beyond Robinson's analysis and consider the
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effects of allowing discrimination on the Marshallian welfare measure
7
given by (4). Differentiation of that equation and use of (6) yield
N N
(7) dW/dt i - q!p! p* q
At t = 0, Pi(t) = p* for all i, and the second summation is zero. It
is easy to show that it is negative for all t > 0. If market i is inter-
mediate, the ith term in that summation is zero for all t. But if dis-
crimination causes anything to change, some markets must not be inter-
mediate. If market i is strong (weak), both [pi(t) - p*] and pit) are
positive (negative), and the i term is negative as long as demand
slopes down.
Integrating (7) over all non-negative t implies directly that the
change in W due to discrimination is always strictly less than (p* - c)
times the change in Q. In the linear case, we thus have a drop in
Marshallian welfare. In general, unless output increases, movement from
single-price to discriminating monopoly causes a fall in W, a net efficiency
loss,
The first term on the right in (7) resembles the usual expression
for the welfare gain from output change in a distorted market; (demand
price - marginal cost) x output change. The second term reflects the
efficiency cost of distributing total output inefficiently among buyers,
of driving marginal valuations apart. Equation (7) indicates that the
net welfare effect of allowing discrimination is the sum of an output
effect of indeterminate sign and a negative distribution effect.
These two effects can be simply illustrated in the two-market
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case by Figure 2. When discrimination is allowed, price in the strong
market rises from p* to p*, while in the weak market it drops to p*. In
S1) while in the weak one
the strong market, quantity falls by (qO -q), while in the weak one
it rises by ( - q). The net welfare gain in the weak market is the
area a'b'e'd' = a'b'c'd' - b'cle', while the loss in the strong market
is abcd + bce. The net gain is thus
AW = [a'b'c'd' - abcd] - [b'c'e' + bce]
= (p* - c) -Q0) - (b'c'e' + bce).
The net change can thus be positive only if total output expands, only
if the increase in sales to the weak market exceeds the drop in sales to
the strong market.
If one thinks that demand curves are about as likely to be concave
as convex, and if one feels that the Marshallian measure should be taken
as seriously as it is taken in most applied welfare analysis, the fore-
going discussion might lead one to the conclusion that monopolistic third-
degree price discrimination should be outlawed. As before, this must
be qualified to some extent by the possibility that such discrimination makes
it profitable to sell to markets that would not be served at all under
single-price monopoly. If discrimination makes possible a large volume
of such new sales, it can lead to an increase in welfare even if total
sales to previously served markets fail to expand.
Finally, it is worth noting explicitly that nothing here conflicts
with the "Ramsey pricing" result that a W-maximizing monopolist subject
to a lower bound on should practice a milder form of third-degree
9discrimination. That result is concerned with efficiently trading off
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welfare against profit, a tradeoff not present in the context of un-
regulated, profit-maximizing monopoly. In Figure 1, the point U is the
unconstrainted W-maximizing point. The iso-W loci are easily proven to
have negative slope when both prices are above c, as shown. It is clear
that any solution to maximizing W subject to a lower bound constraint
on must lie on the locus of tangencies UD. If the constraint is
binding, pricing will involve some degree of discrimination. The point
N has no special properties or attraction in this context; non-dis-
criminatory points generally yield (W, H) pairs that are dominated by
Ramsey points on UD.
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FOOTNOTES
*Professor of Applied Economics, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
1. It is important to point out, as Robinson (pp. 188-90) does but many
subsequent authors do not, that this result depends critically on the
assumption that both markets are served under both regimes. In general,
the profit-maximizing non-discriminatory price may be so high that no
purchases are made in markets that would be profitably served under
discrimination. If this occurs and demands are linear, allowing dis-
crimination serves to increase total output by exactly the amount sold
in the previously excluded markets. (See Merton H. Miller and Raymond
C. Battalio and Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., for more on such cases.) On the
other hand, John E. Kwoka, Jr., has recently shown by example that if
such exclusion can occur, allowing a monopoly to practice second-degree
discrimination (in the form of declining-block pricing) can reduce total
output when demand curves cross.
2. The related local tests of Edgar O. Edwards and Thomas J. Finn share this
same defect.
3. This result and that cited in the preceding sentence require that the
same markets be served under both regimes (see footnote 1, above) and
that distributional and income effects be neglected, so that the aggregate
Marshallian surplus has welfare content.
4. With N markets, the existence problem is solved if it can be shown that
for any non-negative t there exists an N-vector, [Pi] such that
(a) Z'ip = 0, (b) for iI, Pii > 0, and (c) for isI, pi = 0. Since13.~~~~~~~~~~ =1 1 ic
/_____;_1_111_1__I_- __-.
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the r" are all negative, (a) is satisfied by a subspace of dimension
1
(N-1) of vectors with components of different signs. Restriction (c)
reduces the dimensionality by the number of markets in I, which cannot
exceed (N-2) if discrimination is profitable. Restriction (b) then
simply excludes half the remaining subspace, which must be at least
of dimension one, as it is in Figure 1. A set of Pi(t) functions can
thus always be constructed by integration.
5. The approach used here does not seem to yield anything of interest
when all demand functions have constant elasticities, for instance.
6. See footnote 1, above, and the references there cited.
7. As far as I know, only Yamey has formally considered this measure in
the present context, and his treatment is confined to an illustrative
example that does not explicitly involve third-degree discrimination.
8. It should be clear that such a conclusion would not constitute an
endorsement of the Robinson-Putman Act, which cannot fairly be
described as simply prohibiting the form of discrimination analyzed
here.
9. See, for instance, William Baumol and David Bradford.
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